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THE CHAPLAINCY EXCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
"AMERICAN-BORN CLERIC" ANWAR ALAWLAKI AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
K. Benson*
Anwar al-Awlaki, frequently described by the media as an "American-born cleric," was the first American citizen to be targeted for
extrajudicial assassination by the Obama administration as part of the
Global War on Terror (GWOT). While there have been scholarly
works considering the legality of his killing under domestic law, none
have examined his status as a chaplain under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), what this designation could mean for the legality of
Anwar al-Alwaki's killing, or what his killing could mean for the
GWOT in general. This paper provides a necessarily brief history of
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Anwar al-Awlaki's
journey thereto before discussing the Bush and Obama administrations' positions on pertinent legal issues. After establishing that IHL
applies in the case of the al-Awlaki killing, I argue that al-Awlaki
conformed to IHL's standard of religious personnel due to his position as a "cleric," casting doubt on the legality of his killing. The
precedent set by his killing therefore has important ramifications for
other clerics working in cases where IHL applies.

I.

INTRODUCTION: ANWAR AL-AWLAKI

AND THE GLOBAL

WAR ON TERROR

As recently as 2002, the "radical, American-born cleric"' Anwar alAlwaki was a key liaison between reporters and the world of "moderate
Islam," 2 holding a question and answer session on faith for the Washington

* This paper was made possible with the guidance of Ash Bali and support from
the UCLA graduate division. I would also like to thank the rest of my doctoral committee for their unwavering support. All mistakes are my own. Direct correspondence to
kristinabenson@ucla.edu.
1. RadicalAmerican clerickilled in Yemen, officialssay, MSNBC, Sept. 30, 2011,

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44727191/ns/world news-mideast n africa/t/radicalamerican-cleric-killed-yemen-officials-say/#.TI eUsMI ENbw.
2. Scott Shane and Souad Mekhenet Imam's Path from Condemning Terror to
Preaching Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/

world/09awlaki.html?pagewanted=all.
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Post, 3 conducting prayers for Muslim staffers in Congress, 4 and even attending a luncheon at the Pentagon. 5 By 2010, however, Reuters was reporting that Mr. al-Awlaki had been put on a capture or kill list by the Obama
administration, 6 which claimed that Mr. al-Awlaki was not only acting as a
recruiter for al Qaeda,7 but also that he was directing other individuals to
engage in violent acts against Americans. 8 A year later, Mr. al-Alwaki was
killed by a U.S. drone while traveling in Yemen with another American
Muslim, Samir Khan, 9 an event considered sufficiently important to merit a
presidential speech marking the occasion. Mr. al-Awlaki's 16-year old son,
also an American citizen, would be killed by another U.S. drone strike a
few weeks later.' 0 Mr. al-Awlaki was the first American citizen known to
have been targeted for extra judicial assassination in pursuit of the Global
War on Terror (GWOT)."
This paper will consider the question of whether the government was
permitted to target and kill Anwar al-Awlaki under the rules of International
3. Anwar al-Awlaki, Understanding Ramadan: The Month of Fasting, WASH.
Nov. 19, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/01/nation/ramadan awlakil 119.htm.
4. Jana Winter, Some Muslims Attending Capitol Hill PrayerGroup Have Terror
Ties, Probe Reveals, Fox NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2010/11u11 /congressional-muslim-prayer-group-terror-ties/
5. Martha Raddatz, Radical Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki Invited to Private Lunch at
Pentagon in Effort to Reach Out to Muslims After 9/11, ABC NEWS, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Blotter/al-qaeda-cleric-awlaki-invited-pentagon-91 l/
story?id= 11935006.
6. Adam Entous, U.S. Targets American Born Cleric in Yemen: Officials,
REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/06/usyemen-usa-cleric-idUSTRE63543820100406.
7. Scott Shane, Judging a Long, Deadly Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/20 11/10/01 /world/american-strike-on-american-target-revives-contentious-constitutional-issue.html.
8. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks at the "Change of Office,"
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony, The White House Office of the Press
Sec'y (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-president-change-office-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff-ceremony.
9. Andrew Rafferty, American Drone Death Highlights Controversy, NBC NEWS,
Feb. 5 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/news/2013/02/05/16856963-american-dronedeaths-highlight-controversy?lite.
10. Nasser al-Awlaki, The Drone That Killed My Grandson, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/the-drone-that-killed-my-grandson.
html?_r=0.
11. David S. Cloud, Jeffrey Fleishman and Brian Bennett, U.S. Drone Strike Kills
U.S.-Born Al-Qaeda Figure Awlaki L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-awlaki-killed-20 111001.
POST,
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Humanitarian Law (IHL), arguing that as he was a "cleric,"12 he was considered religious personnel and thus an inappropriate target for assassination under IHL's principles of distinction. The death of Mr. al-Awlaki thus
has broad implications for the chaplaincy exemption under IHL, and for the
GWOT in general.
Before proceeding further it should be noted that release of classified
or top secret information might impact the following discussion, particularly if Mr. al-Awlaki is found to have had a primary function oriented
around planning or directing attacks, or if evidence came to light suggesting
that he regularly offered tactical training to potential combatants. Additionally, it should also be stressed that the following discussion of Mr. al-Awlaki as a "chaplain" refers solely to his designation under IHL, and in no

way suggests or implies that Mr. al-Awlaki was speaking on behalf of Muslims, or in a manner consistent with the central tenets of Islam. Finally, this
paper does not address the issues raised by Mr. al-Awlaki's status as a citizen, nor the legality of CIA-operated drone strikes, nor the legality of
drones themselves. These are certainly important issues but do not figure
into the scope of this analysis.
I will begin with a short background on Anwar al-Alwaki and then
move to a discussion of the challenges posed by transnational armed groups
to the framework of IIL. I will then demonstrate that IHL applies to American operations in Yemen, thus triggering a mandate for distinguishing between civilians and combatants before moving on to argue that Mr. alAwlaki conforms to the definition of religious personnel set forth under
IHL. Finally, I end by discussing the ramifications of this classification,
both for the GWOT and for IHL in general.

II.

FROM "MODERATE ISLAM" TO "AMERICAN BORN CLERIC:.
ANWAR AL-AWLAKI AND His JOURNEY TO AL QAEDA IN THE
ARABIAN PENINSULA

The media often refers to Mr. al-Awlaki as "American born," implying
that he was not truly American but for an accident of birth, however his
childhood and adolescence was in many as "American" as anyone's. Born
in New Mexico in 1961, he lived there until returning to Yemen, Sana'a in
1978 with his family as a teenager and completing his secondary educa-

12. "Cleric" occurs in quotation marks because there is no official clergy in Islam,
nor an official hierarchy like those in the Catholic and Episcopal churches, for example.
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tion.13 After his graduation from high school in Yemen, he applied to several colleges in the U.S., enrolling in Colorado State University and
graduating with a degree in engineering, and then going on to earn an M.A.
in education at San Diego State University.' 4 By his late twenties, Mr. alAwlaki had married, and had become an Imam and spiritual leader, first in
San Diego, where his sermons were attended by future 9/11 hijackers
Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi,' 5 and then at a mosque in Falls
Church, VA, near Washington, D.C.' 6
Reports indicate that he was on the government's radar screen as early
as 1999, when the FBI investigated him for possible connections to Osama
bin Laden.' 7 His telephone number was also found when police raided the
Hamburg, Germany apartment of Ramzi Binalshibh, who was believed to
have played a part in the 9/11 attacks, 8 and evidence also suggests that he
had met and developed a relationship with two of the future 9/11 hijackers
while preaching in San Diego.19
Even so, no evidence has ever linked Mr. al-Awlaki to the 9/11 attacks. In fact, he was invited to a Pentagon luncheon in Virginia shortly
after the 9/11 attacks, 2 0 as "the secretary of the Army [redacted] was eager
to have a presentation from a moderate Muslim" 2' and, at the time, Mr. al13. Jason Burke, Anwar al-Awlaki Obituary: Yemeni American al Qaeda Propagandist and TerrorLeader, GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
201 1/oct/02/anwar-al-awlaki.
14. R. Stickney, Anwar al-Alwaki Killed by Special Task CIA Task Force, NBC
SAN DIEGO, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Anwar-al-AwlakiKilled-CIA-I 30865243.html.
15. Frank Gardner, Islamist ClericAnwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, BBC NEWS,
Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 15121879.
16. Scott Neuman, Awlaki: From San Diego Cleric to Wanted Terrorist, NPR
(Sept. 30, 2011, 11:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/30/140950143/al-awlakifrom-san-diego-cleric-to-wanted-terrorist.
17. Aamer Madhani, Cleric al-Awlaki Dubbed 'Bin Laden of the Internet,'" USA
TODAY, Aug. 24, 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-25IAAwlaki25_CVN.htm
18. Ahmed al-Haj & Donna Abu Nasr, U.S. Imam Wanted in Yemen Over AlQaida Suspicions, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/nation/
69721527.htmlpage=2&c=Y.
19. Burke, supra note 13.
20. Sean Alfano, Anwar al-Awlaki, RadicalIslamic Cleric Wanted by the CIA, Ate
Lunch at the Pentagon After 9/11: Report, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 21, 2010, http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/10/21/2010-10-21
anwaralawlaki radical islamicclericwanted-by-the-cia atelunchat-pentagon-af.
html?r=news/national.
2 1. Id.
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Awlaki was seen as a "moderate Muslim." In the months after 9/11, Mr. alAwlaki even became a "go-to Muslim cleric for reporters scrambling to
explain Islam" 22 and he hosted an online discussion about the meaning of
Ramadan for the Washington Post on November of 2001.23 In this discussion, his expressed views included moderate, if not relatively liberal,
stances on inter-faith relations, women, and the Taliban, and he invited "our
non-Muslim friends" to read the Qur'an to better understand Islam" in addition to acknowledging that "[Muslims and Christians] definitely need more
mutual understanding. "24
Absent in this online discussion was a stated or even implied interest
in violence of any kind, as well as any sympathy towards al Qaeda; furthermore, it seems as though Mr. al-Awlaki identified as an American, rather
than, say, a Muslim American, or an American of Yemeni descent. For
example, to one commenter who asked what the U.S. should have done in
response to the 9/11 attacks, Mr. al-Awlaki responded:
... Our government could have dealt with the terrorist attacks as a
crime against America rather than a war against America. So the
guilty would be tried and only them [sic] would be punished rather
than bombing an already destroyed country. I do not restrict myself to
US media. I check out Aljazeerah [sic] and European media such as
the BBC. I am seeing something that you are not seeing because of
the one-sidedness of the US media. I see the carnage of Afghanistan.
I see the innocent civilian deaths. That is why my opinion is different.
Keep in mind that I have no sympathy for whoever committed the

crimes of Sep 11th [sic]. But that doesn't mean that I would approve
the killing of my Muslim brothers and sisters in Afghanistan. Even
though this is a dissenting view nowadays but as an American I do
have the right to have a contrary opinion (emphasis added). 25
Mr. al-Awlaki's social attitudes were similarly moderate, and he
stressed the inherently peaceful nature of Islam. In response to a question
about forcing women to wear a chadoror burqa and prohibiting girls from
going to school, he implicitly criticized the Taliban and the Saudi governments, highlighting a progressive interpretation of Islam when he answered:
The imposing of the Burqa [sic] on women by a government never
happened in the 1400 year history of the Muslim world. The Taliban
22. S. Shane, supra note 2.
23. Anwar al-Awlaki, Understanding Ramadan: The Month of Fasting, WASH.

Nov. 19, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/O1/nation/ramadan awlakil I 19.htm.
PosT,

24. Id.
25. Id.
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[sic] have no precedence in this. The Prophet along with his companions who ruled over the Muslims after him never did that. According
to Prophet Muhammad: "Education is mandatory on [sic]every Muslim male and female." That is the teaching of Islam and if anyone
does otherwise they have disobeyed the Prophet of Islam himself.
About killing, the greatest sin in Islam after associating [with] other
gods besides Allah is killing an innocent soul. 26
In 2002, Mr. al-Awlaki conducted a prayer service at the U.S. Capital
for the Congressional Muslim Staff Association, 27 but by the end of that
year he moved to the U.K. to give lectures at mosques, and universities, as
well as at study circles across Britain as part of a campaign by the Muslim
Association of Britain.2 8 His reasons for moving out of the U.S. are not well
known. There is no publicly available information suggesting that he became the subject of any sort of FBI or DHS investigation, or that he experienced any particularly traumatic event. Whatever the reason, it was at this

time that he seemed to have had a shift in his thinking. At the East London
Mosque in Tower Hamlets, for example, he told his audience "not to turn in
fellow Muslims to the police" at their "Stop Police Terror" event, 2930 and in
2003, he released a lecture series on jihad.3 1
He did not, however, spend much time in Britain and it is unclear as to
what prompted him to move to Yemen in 2004. Some reports indicate he
was banned from living in Britain 32 while others allege that he moved because he was ultimately "unable to support himself." 33 In any case, he
26. Id.
27. Jana Winter, Some Muslims Attending Capitol Hill PrayerGroup Have Terror

Ties, Probe Reveals, Fox NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2010/11/l/congressional-muslim-prayer-group-terror-ties/.
28. Duncan Gardham, Anwar al-Awlaki: Al-Qaeda mouthpiece who espoused a
'justdo it' brandof terrorism,DAILY TELEGRAPH (London) (Sept. 30, 2011, 10:23 PM),

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8800370/Anwar-al-Awlaki-AlQaeda-mouthpice-who-espoused-a-just-do-it-brand-of-terrorism.html.
29. Michael Weiss, The Killing of Anwar al -Awlaki is a hammer blow to alQaeda and a reminder of how British campuses host extremists, DAILY TELEGRAPH

(Sept. 30, 2011), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/michaelweiss/100108397/the-killing-of-anwar-al-awlaki-is-a-hammer-blow-to-al-qaeda-and-a-reminder-of-how-britishcampuses-host-extremists/.
30. Gardham, Anwar al-Awlaki, supra note 28.
31. Duncan Gardham, Al Qaeda Leader's Tour of Britain Revealed, TELEGRAPH,

Nov 5, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terroism-in-the-uk/8113977/
Al-Qaeda-leaders-tour-of-Britain-revealed.html.
32. Id.
33. Obituary:Anwar al-Awlaki, BBC
news/world-middle-east-1 1658920.

NEWS,

Sept 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
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moved with his wife and five children to his ancestral village in the southern province of Shabwa in Yemen 34 and became a lecturer at al-Iman University, a Sunni religious school in the capital city of Sana'a where his
father had once worked. 35 In late 2006, Mr. al-Awlaki was arrested for kidnapping and terrorism charges and imprisoned until 2007, when he was
released after senior members of his tribe intervened on his behalf.3 6 Although his imprisonment was in Yemen, it has been alleged that it was as a
result of coordination between Yemeni and U.S. authorities, and that Mr. alAwlaki was tortured while in prison.37 These charges do not, at least from
publicly available information, seem to figure in to the Obama administration's reasons for targeting Mr. al-Awlaki for extrajudicial assassination.
In early February of 2010, Al Jazeera conducted an English-language
interview with Mr. al-Alwaki, asking him, among other things, about his
role in the failed attempt to blow up a commercial airplane on Christmas of
2009, and whether he was involved in the Ft. Hood shooting. 38 He denied
direct involvement in either incident, saying that although he theoretically
supported the Christmas 2009 attempt to bomb the plane, he had not issued
a fatwa39 condoning the attack. 40 Even so, his answers indicate a profound
shift in outlook compared to the one he held in his earlier online chat with
the Washington Post. Whereas he previously self-identified as American, he
now referred to the United States as a "tyrant;" whereas he had previously
condemned any type of violence, he now dismissed the seriousness and
gravity of 300 American deaths:
Yes, I support what Umar Farouk [Abdulmuttalib] has done after I
have been seeing my brothers being killed in Palestine for more than
60 years, and others being killed in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And in
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Burke, supra note 13.
37. Paul Sperry, Jihad, Va.:Awlaki may be dead, but his radicalAmerican mosque
remains, N.Y. POST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolum-

nists/jihadva_2UmOJEPI NQHzF6g9OgWYfl.
38. Interview: Anwar al-Alwaki Yemen-Based Religious ScholarSays He Supports
Attempt to Blow Up a US-Bound Plane, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Feb. 7, 2010), http://
english.aljazeera.net/focus/2010/02/2010271074776870.html.
39. A fatwa (fatawa pl.) is a non-binding, non-compulsive legal responsa. In
Sunni Islam, Muslims are not obliged to follow the directions given in afatwa-they
are only considered binding on their authors. A person qualified to issue a fatwa is
called a mufti. The fact that Anwar al-Awlaki had no formal training in theology, Islamic law, Islamicate history or traditions, or Islamic jurisprudence means that he was
not technically qualified to issue fatawa.
40. Interview, supra note 38.
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my tribe too, US missiles have killed 17 women and 23 children, so
do not ask me if al-Qaeda has killed or blown up a US civil jet after
all this. The 300 Americans are nothing comparing to the thousands
of Muslims who have been killed. . .1 have said in an earlier interview

with Al Jazeera's Yusri Fouda that the United States is a tyrant, and
tyrants across history have all had terrible ends. I believe the West
does not want to realise this universal fact. Muslims in Europe and
America are watching what is happening to Muslims in Palestine,
Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will take revenge for all Muslims
across the globe (emphasis added). 4 1
A few months after he completed this interview, the president's Office
of Legal Counsel issued a 50-page memo, likely completed on or around
June 10. It concluded that Mr. al-Awlaki could be legally killed if it was not
feasible to capture him because intelligence agencies said he was taking
part in the war between the United States and Al Qaeda, posed a significant
threat to Americans, and because "Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling to stop him." 4 2 The legality of his killing, according to sources in
the Obama administration, partially hinged on the fact that he had "taken on
an increasingly operation role" in AQAP since late 2009, including preparing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallib in his attempt to detonate an explosive
device on Christmas Day 2009.43
On September 30, a CIA drone strike killed Mr. al-Awlaki and his
traveling companion, Samir Khan, another American citizen.44 In order to
determine whether or not IHL applied to this operation, we must first determine whether or not this drone strike took place within the wider context of
an armed conflict.
4 1. Id.

42. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2011, at Al, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/

TIMES,

middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all.
43. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-cv-1469
(D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010), available at http://www.1awfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2010/09/usgbrief.pdf. "Since late 2009, Anwar al-Aulaqi has taken on an increasingly
operational role in the group, including preparing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who
received instructions from Anwar Al-Aulaqi to detonate an explosive device aboard a
US airplane over US airspace and thereafter attempted to do so aboard a Northwest
Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, for his operation"
Id. These sources further refer to al-Awlaki as a "senior operational leader." Id. at 24,
29 n.14.

44. Mark Mazetti et al., Two Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Alwaki in Yemen,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/
anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?ref=anwaralawlaki.
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If there is an armed conflict at hand between AQAP and the U.S.,
international humanitarian law will apply, and it will then become necessary to determine Mr. al-Awlaki's exact role in the organization before deciding whether or not he was an appropriate target.

III.

Do US

DRONE STRIKES IN YEMEN DIRECTED AT
TO THE LEVEL OF ARMED CONFLICT?

AQAP

RISE

Hostilities directed at a transnational armed group can be governed by
IHL, but even if IHL applies in one situation involving a particular armed
group, it does not necessarily apply in all cases involving this armed group.
Put differently, IHL might apply in an armed conflict between American
troops and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, but this does not mean that IHL
must therefore automatically apply wherever al Qaeda forces (or its affiliates) and American troops might find themselves.
For IHL to apply to a transnational armed group like al Qaeda or its
affiliates such a group either must be involved in an armed conflict, or alternatively, an armed conflict between other parties "must exist on the territory where" the armed group acts. 45 This is because the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the two 1977 Additional Protocols apply only to armed
conflicts and distinguish between international and non-international armed
conflicts.4 6 Armed conflicts may be of a mixed character in that they can
incorporate aspects "of both inter-state hostilities (between two or more belligerent States) and intra-state hostilities (between two or more clashing
groups within the territory of one of the belligerent states" in the midst of a
civil war). 4 7 This was, for example, the case in Afghanistan in 2001,
wherein the Taliban, having just fought an interstate war with the Northern
Alliance, became a party to an inter-state war with an American-led coalition for their protection of al Qaeda.48
In the case of Yemen, U.S. operations have been taking place with the
consent of the Yemeni government. According to ICTY's Tddic decision,
the threshold for determining that a non-international conflict (NIAC) is at
hand breaks down into two elements: "(a) the intensity of the violence and

45. Marco Sass6li, TransnationalArmed Groups and InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 6 HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.hpcr-

research.org/sites/defauIt/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf.
46. Id.
47. YORAM

DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-

NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

48. Id.

14 (2004).
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the (b) the organization of the parties." 4 9 Both of these elements must be
"evaluated on a case-by-case basis by weighing up a host of indicative
data." 0 Protocol II excludes "situations of internal disturbances and tensions. . .and other acts of a similar nature"; relevant factors that contribute
to designating an armed conflict as such include intensity, number of active
participants, number of victims, duration and protracted character of the
violence, organization and discipline of the parties, capacity to respect IHL,
the collective, open, and coordinated character of the hostilities, direct involvement of governmental armed forces, and de facto authority by the
non-state actor over potential victims.5'
In considering these criteria, it is tempting to source the current conflict in Yemen back to 2002, when unstaffed Predator drones were flying
over Yemeni airspace and firing at suspected al Qaeda fighters in an attempt to kill the alleged leader of AQAP, Ali Qaed Salim Sinan alHarethi. 52 However, a lengthy period of inactivity followed, and in determining whether or not an armed conflict exists (thus triggering IHL) we
will therefore limit our analysis to the drone strikes and joint operations
between Yemeni and American authorities that began in 2009.
The Washington Post reported in early 2010 that "U.S. military teams
and intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with
Yemeni troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people,
among them six of 15 top leaders of a regional al-Qaeda affiliate, according
to senior administration officials." 53 The Post also reported, "American advisers are acting as intermediaries between the Yemeni forces and hundreds
of U.S. military and intelligence officers . . . The combined efforts have

resulted in more than two dozen ground raids and airstrikes [in Yemen]." 54
The New York Times corroborated the existence of such raids, and characterized American operations in Yemen as part of a "shadow war" involving
American personnel, cruise missiles, and fighter jets.55
49. Sylvain Vit6, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 69, 76 (2009).
50. Id.
51. Sass6li, supra note 45, at 6.
52. See generally Frank Gardner, CIA 'killed al-Qaedasuspects' in Yemen, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 5, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2402479.stm.
53. Dana Priest, U.S. military teams, intelligence deeply involved in aiding Yemen
on strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html.
54. Id.
55. Scott Shane et al., Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E2D
6133AF936A2575BCOA9669D8B63.
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After October of 2010, the Obama administration debated on the possibility of launching a CIA-operated drone strike program in Yemen, and
available evidence indicates that they moved forward with this program, 56
launching drones from an American military base in Djibouti known as
Camp Lemonnier. Formerly a French Foreign Legion base, it is now home
to a U.S. Air Force/CIA Predator drone detachment and a listening station
that serves-along with other American bases in the area - as a staging
ground for launching drones into East Africa and the Arabian peninsula.57
Therefore, given the frequency of drone strikes and other military operations against AQAP in the tribal areas of Yemen for nearly two years,
there can be little doubt that U.S. activities in Yemen rise to the level of an
armed conflict. The fact that these activities are at the invitation and cooperation of the Yemeni government, or at the very least occur with their permission, renders the conflict non-international. Given that AQAP has a
formal leadership structure, is as aforementioned "hierarchical, compartmentalized, and highly decentralized, allowing it to withstand attacks and
arrests," 5 8 and continues to engineer several high-profile attempted attacks
against European and American targets, 59 it can be argued that this noninternational armed conflict is a stand-alone conflict against AQAP, thus
triggering IHL, and with it, principles of distinction. Put simply, the frequency and intensity of American drone strikes targeting AQAP means that
there is an armed conflict. The fact that these drone strikes are taking place
with the permission and cooperation of the Yemeni government means that
this armed conflict is non-international, and international humanitarian law
is the relevant body of law here.
IV.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION UNDER IHL:
WHO MAY BE KILLED?

The principle of distinction refers to the broad categories of combatant
and civilian, and the requirement to distinguish between them when pursuing military objectives. These classifications are hardly rhetorical, and the
stakes are high: being designated as a combatant, (lawful or otherwise) allows parties to the conflict to use all force necessary to achieve military
56. Associated Press, Top National Security Lawyers Say American Citizens are
Targets if They're At War with U.S., WASH. PosT, Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/top-national-security-lawyers-say-americancitizens-are-targets-if-theyre-at-war-with-us/2011/12/01/gIQAv9CvGO-story.html.
57. Id.
58. Jonathan Masters, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369

59. Id.
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goals unless such acts are prohibited by law.60 Combatants may be attacked
at any time: while planning an attack, while engaging in active hostilities on
a battlefield, when they are on their way to a battlefield, or "even while they
are sleeping in their barracks." 61 Civilians, on the other hand, are regarded
as impermissible military targets. They "benefit from immunity from attack," and have traditionally been negatively defined as those who are not
participating in hostilities. 62 Before continuing, however, I again will stress
that this paper is simply examining the legality of Mr. al-Awlaki's activities, not the moral or tactical implications thereof. Referring to Mr. al-Awlaki as a "civilian," or a "chaplain," as well as any characterizations of his
actions as "protected," therefore, refer solely to his designation under controlling law.
Article 52§ 1 and § 2 of Protocol I of 1977 authorizes armed attacks
only if they are directed towards military objectives, and grants general protection to civilian objects. The US Air Force Pamphlet (1976) states, for
example: "The requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects, imposes obligations on all the parties to the conflict to establish and maintain the
distinctions." 63 Although a number of states (including the U.S.) are not
party to the Additional Protocol, this general principle of distinction is
widely recognized as binding customary international law, meaning that
"even states that have not signed the treaty are bound by those aspects that
are recognized as customary."M 65
60.

PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY & CONFLICT RESEARCH, HARV. UNIV.,

IHL AND CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES IN THE OPT 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/ParticipationBrief.pdf
[hereinafter HOSTILITIES IN THE OPT]
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, PracticeRelating to Rule 7. The Principleof
Distinction between Civilian Objects andMilitary Objectives (2012), availableat http://
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_couusrule7.
64. HOSTILITIES IN THE OPT, supra note 60, at 4.
65. In a NIAC, each party is bound to apply, as a minimum, the fundamental
provisions contained in Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions, which are
further developed in the Geneva Protocol II of 1977. Michelle Mack, Int'l Comm. of the
Red Cross, Increasing Respect for InternationalHumanitarianLaw in Non-International Armed Conflicts (2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc_002_0923.pdf. Both Common Article 3 and Geneva Protocol II apply with equal
force to all parties to an armed conflict, government and transnational armed groups
alike. The rules of customary international law as well as the basic principles of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality similarly apply.
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State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh agrees in theory with this
principle, stating in a speech that the U.S. is in an "armed conflict" with
forces associated with al Qaeda, and that attacks taking place within the
scope of this "armed conflict" must conform to "law of war principles"
including those of "distinction" and "proportionality," 66 He has also stated
that that attacks must also conform to "law of war principles." A leaked
Justice Department White Paper considering the use of force against an
American citizen associated with Al Qaeda et al, likely written in 2010, also
refers to "U.S. and "international law," indicating that the administration
still regarded IHL an important source of authority within the context of the
global war on terror.67
To be sure, the laws of war in NIAC are not necessarily perfectly
suited for handling the unique challenges posed by the rise of transnational
armed groups. States have consistently rejected proposals for parity between the law that governs NIAC and the law governing IAC, and have
preferred to regulate NIAC through their domestic legal systems; laws governing NIAC have therefore been characterized as "underdeveloped." 68 A
resolution adopted in 1970 by the UN Assembly, however, speaks of "combatants in all armed conflicts," 69 suggesting that attacks on transnational
armed groups should be carried out in a manner consistent with the principles of distinction. Additionally, the principles of customary international
law have been recognized as applicable to non-international armed conflicts, making the principle of distinction apply to the armed forces of a
state using force within the context of NIAC. 70 Even so, IHL was clearly
designed in an era dominated by nation-state actors, and the definitions of
"combatant," "direct participation," and "civilian" arguably reflect as such.
66. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor for the U.S. Department of State, Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), (transcript
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/l39119.htm).
67. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER, Lawfulness of a Legal OperationDirected Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior OperationalLeader ofAl-Qa'ida or an
Associated Force, 1, 3 available at msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/
020413_DOJ WhitePaper.pdf (last visited on Feb. 7, 2013) [Hereinafter DOJ WHITE
PAPER]

68. Mark David Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, 'Unlawful Enemy Combatant':Status, Theory, or Neither?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 19, 24 (2007).
69. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DoSWALD-BECK, ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 12 (4th ed. 2009), availableat http://www.
icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
70. Kenneth Watkin, Warriors without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIEs 3, 65
(2005), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf.

14

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTs LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

The fact that the administration continued referring to laws of war principles as recently as 2010, furthermore, indicates that IHL remains relevant to
the development of a post-September 11 legal framework.
The language of Article 51(3) clearly states: "Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities." 7' In order for an action to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, the following cumulative criteria must be fulfilled:
1.The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the
detriment of another (belligerent nexus). 72
In sum, even in a GWOT context, a given actor becomes a legitimate
target due not to his or her official membership status in an organization,
but because of his or her role in the organization as determined by actual
activities.73 In a leaked Justice Department White Paper, the administration
argued for an expanded definition of "imminent" danger, contending that
membership in Al Qaeda would be enough to expose an individual to the
legal use of lethal force. 74 Under IHL, however, this would not be the case.
Furthermore, the idea of "membership" cannot be established simply
through affiliations, family ties, or mere association; within the context of
IHL, "combatants" are only those who are members in a transnational
group's armed forces. According to the International Committee of the Red
Cross:
71. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Int'l Armed
Conflicts, art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl .nsfl7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee I4a77fdc 125641 e0052b079.
72. Nils Melzer, ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION Op DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HoSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 16 (2009),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
73. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Law of Armed Conflict: Non-international

Armed Conflict, 17-20 (June 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/law 10 final.pdf.
74. DOJ WHITE PAPER , supra note 67, at 1.
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For the practical purposes of the principle of distinction, therefore,
membership in such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation,
family ties, or other criteriaprone to error, arbitrariness or abuse.
Instead, membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on
behalf of a non-state party to the conflict. Consequently, under IHL,
the decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized
armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for
the group involving his or her directparticipationin hostilities(hereafter: "continuous combat function)" (emphasis added)."
Worth noting is that there are repeated uses of words like "function"

and "act." In other words, there must be an action and it must be part of an
individual's continuous role in the group. Furthermore, as abhorrent and
possibly dangerous as it may be, "plotting" to kill Americans does not necessarily make someone a combatant. 76 Again, this is not to say that plotting
against Americans is excusable or even non-threatening to American lives
and interests, but rather that IHL, as it currently exists and has traditionally
been applied, does not regard "plotting" as constitutive of "direct participation." Additionally, pledging to "uphold and support the violent and murderous theories of al Qaeda"7 7 and "exhort[ing] Americans to violence"78
also falls outside the scope of direct participation given that:
Specific acts may constitute part of the hostilities even if they are not
likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity
of a party to the conflict. In the absence of such military harm, however, a specific act must be likely to cause at least death, injury, or
destruction. 79

As YouTube sermons do not cause death, injury, or harm, they cannot
rightly be categorized as "direct participation" under IHL. Such activities
75. Melzer, supra note 72, at 33.
76. Ken Dilanian, Senate DemocratChallenges Obama on Killing American Terror Suspects, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
feb/I 0/news/la-pn-senate-democrat-challenges-obama-on-killing-american-terror-suspects-20120208.
77. Robert Gibbs, White House Press Sec'y, Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (Aug. 3, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs- 182010).
78. Dennis McDonough, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor to the President, Remarks of
Denis McDonough As Prepared for Delivery (Mar. 6, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/06/remarks-denis-mcdonoughdeputy-national-security-advisor-president-prepa).
79. Melzer, supra note 72, at 49.
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may, however, be constitutive of propaganda, which are still not held to be
directly participative under IHL,80 or alternatively, might be considered related to recruitment. Even so, recruiters for transnational armed groups are
not considered combatants according to the ICRC.8 1 It is therefore a "continuous combat function" that would render Mr. al-Awlaki a member of the
armed forces and thus a permanent lawful target for the duration of hostilities. 82 The abovementioned requirement for "continuous combat function"
further means that "direct involvement in plots" 83 would only have rendered
Mr. al-Awlaki a target during the "immediate execution of the act and the
preparatory measures forming an integral part of that act." 84 If evidence
emerges that his primary role was that of "plotting," he might then become
a combatant; otherwise, he remains a civilian who is only vulnerable to
attack while he is executing a plot, or preparing to execute it.
Rule 6 of Customary International Humanitarian Law establishes that
transnational armed groups, like state organizations, are entitled to medical
and religious personnel.85 Rule 27 furthermore states that "religious personnel exclusively assigned to religious duties must be respected and protected
in all circumstances. They lose their protection if they commit, outside their
humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy." 86 The loss of this protection, however, only lasts while they are engaged in "immediate execution" of this act or in "preparatory measures" for it.
Finally, the administration has also alleged that Mr. al-Awlaki was involved in recruitment, even though Mr. Abdulmuttalib's testimony makes it
clear that Mr. Abdulmuttalib sought out Mr. al-Awlaki, rather than the other
way around;87 this will be explored in detail in a later section. However, for
now, suffice it to say that even if Mr. al-Awlaki had reached out to Mr.
Abdulmuttalib for the purposes of recruitment, Mr. al-Awlaki would still
80. See Melzer, supra note 72, at 34.
81. See Melzer, supra note 72, at 66.
82. See Melzer, supra note 72, at 27, 33-36.
83. See Press Briefing, Press Sec'y Jay Carney, White House Office of the Press
Secretary (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/201 1/
10/12/press-briefing#transcript.
84. See Melzer, supra note 72, at 68.
85. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary InternationalHumanitarian
Law March 2005: The Principle of Distinction (2005), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfl
FULL/612?OpenDocument.

86. Id.
87. See Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10cv-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010), availableat http://www.1awfareblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/09/usgbrief.pdf.
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have remained a civilian under IHL given that "recruiters, trainers, financiers and propagandists may continuously contribute to the general war effort of a non-state party, but they are not members of an organized armed
group belonging to that party unless their function additionally includes activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities." 88
Once again, I will stress that the analysis here is not concerned with
the moral or ethical correctness of Mr. al-Awlaki's actions, but rather with
their legality under IHL. Next, we will examine the nature of Mr. al-Awlaki's alleged activities before considering his classification as a "cleric."

V.

ANWAR AL-AWLAKI: "INTERNET IDEOLOGUE" OR

"AQAP

OPERATIVE"?

It bears repeating that the public has not been given access to many
documents pertaining to Mr. al-Awlaki's role in AQAP, 89 and I will once
again note that this Article simply deals with the legal, rather than moral or
ethical, issues of Mr. al-Awlaki's killing. That said, it is difficult to determine the precise nature of Mr. al-Awlaki's involvement with the group with
absolute accuracy. Drawing from White House and other official communications, however, we can determine several aspects of Mr. al-Awlaki's relationship with AQAP that are relevant in assessing his role in the
organization for the purposes of this Article.
Originally, the White House spoke of Mr. Awlaki primarily, if not
solely, in terms of his role as an Internet ideologue, waffling on the issue of
his formal affiliation with al Qaeda: in early 2010, for example, the White
House referred to him as "somebody who has sought over the Internet to
spread that sort of hate and perversion, and obviously to do harm in spreading that hate,"90 and in May of 2010, he was referred to as someone who
"use[s] the Internet and extremist websites to exhort people already living
in the United States to take up arms and launch terrorist attacks from
within." 9' This is the case even though Mr. al-Awlaki was reported to have
been placed on the capture or kill list as early as April of 2010.
88. See Melzer, supra note 72, at 34.
89. Editorial, Justifying the Killing of an American: The government's legal memo
on Anwar al-Awlaki's death is a step, but not enough of one, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011,
at A22, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/opinion/justifying-the-killingof-an-american.html.

90. Gibbs, supra note 77.
91. Remarks by Assistant to the Presidentfor Homeland Security and Counterter-

rorism John Brennan at CSIS, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y (May 26,
2010), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi.
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It was at around this time that Justice Department lawyers wrote a
White Paper addressing the legality of Mr. al-Alwaki's killing. 92 The authors argued that the U.S. "retains its authority to use force against alQa'ida and associated forces.. .when it targets a senior operational leader of
the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning operations to kill
Americans. . . The fact that this person would be a U.S. citizen would not
alter this conclusion." 9 3 Although it is implied repeatedly throughout the
White Paper that Mr. al-Alwaki is a "senior operational leader," no evidence is given to support this claim.
By August of 2010, the White House was hinting to the American
people that Mr. al-Awlaki had al Qaeda affiliations, however, they still publicly focused primarily on his YouTube videos:
The United States hasn't decided that Anwar al-Awlaki is aligned
with a terroristgroup, Anwar al-Awlaki has in videos cast his lot

with al Qaeda and its extremist allies. Anwar al-Awlaki is acting as a
regional commander for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula . . . and
... has on countless times in video pledged to uphold andsupport the
violent and murderous theories of al Qaeda. . . . I think the notion
that somehow anybody in this country confuses traveling overseas

and the role that Anwar al-Awlaki has in inciting violence - they're
not even in the same ballpark (emphasis added). 94
It should also be noted that Mr. al-Awlaki's relationship to the Christmas Day Bomber and the Ft. Hood shooter were initially solely described as
one wherein he "inspired" those responsible, rather than directed or trained
them.95 In early 2010, the administration also began to use language suggesting that Mr. al-Awlaki was recruiting English-speakers to the ranks of
al Qaeda and its affiliates through these videos and through his familiarity
with American culture. Alternatively, the administration referred to him as
an "ideologue" responsible for "propaganda." 96
92. Marco Mazzetti, Charli Savage, and Scott Shane, How a U.S. citizen came to
be in America's cross-hairs. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/1 0/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americascross-hairs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
93. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 67, at 3.
94. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y (Aug. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/pressbriefing-press-secretaryrobert-gibbs-832010.
95. See Martha Raddatz & Kristina Wong, Al Awlaki UrgesMuslims to Kill Americans in New Video, ABC WORLD NEWS (Nov. 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/
radical-muslim-cleric-anwar-al-awlaki-urges-killing/story?id= 12089807&page=2.
96. McDonough, supra note 78.
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For example, in early March of 2011, Deputy Director National Security Advisor to the President Denis McDonough made a speech wherein he
put Mr. al-Awlaki in the same category as Adam Gadahn and Omar
Hamammi, saying:
There's Adam Gadahn, who grew up in California and now calls
himself an al Qaeda spokesman. There's Anwar al-Awlaki, who was
born in the United States and now exhorts Americans to violence

from hiding in Yemen as part of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
And there's Omar Hammami, an Alabama native who joined the terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia and uses rap and hip hop in an
attempt to reach young Americans (emphasis added). 97
In other portions of the speech, McDonough referred to "propaganda
videos"-though he did not refer to Mr. al-Alwaki himself as a "propagandist"-and in his discussion of the Ft. Hood attacks, McDonough seemed to
imply that while Mr. al-Awlaki was not a culprit, he may have provided
some sort of impetus for the attack to occur: "In our review of the Fort
Hood attack, we deepened our understanding of the tactics that extremists
like al-Awlaki use to push people toward violence, as well as how an individual becomes radicalized (emphasis added)." 98
In early 2011, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
Michael Leiter, said "[Anwar al-Awlaki] certainly is the most well-known
English speaking ideologue who is speaking directly to folks here in the

homeland. There are several others who we're concerned with, but I think
Awlaki [sic] probably does have the greatest audience on the Internet and
the like (emphasis added)." 99
As late as June of 2011, the administration was still referring to Mr. alAwlaki in terms of his role as a public speaker, saying:
... And it is al-Qa'ida's adherents-individuals, sometimes with lit-

tle or no direct physical contact with al-Qa'ida, who have succumbed
to its hateful ideology and who have engaged in, or facilitated, terrorist activities here in the United States. These misguided individuals
are spurredon by the likes of al-Qaida's Adam Gadahn and Anwar
al-Awlaki in Yemen, who speak English and preach violence in slick
videos over the Internet. And we have seen the tragic results, with
the murder of a military recruiter in Arkansas two years ago and the
97. McDonough, supra note 78.
98. McDonough, supra note 78.
99. Dan Murphy, Anwar al-Awlaki is Dead: what it means for U.S., Yemen,
SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Backchannels/2011/0930/Anwar-al-Awlaki-dead-what-it-means-for-US-Yemen.
CHRISTIAN

20

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

attack on our servicemen and women at Fort Hood (emphasis
added). '0

By his death in September 2011, however, the White House was no
longer speaking of his "connections," "links," or "affiliations" to the Ft.
Hood shooter, the 9/11 hijackers, or the Christmas Day Bomber, asserting
that "[Mr. Al-Awlaki] directed the failed attempt to blow up an airplane on
Christmas Day in 2009. [And] he directed the failed attempt to blow up
U.S. cargo planes in 2010."1o' White House Press Secretary Jay Carney
additionally alleged in October 2011 that he "was an operational leader of
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" and that he was "directly involved in
plots. . .that would have resulted in terrorist acts against the United
States."l 02
Even so, his activities as an "ideologue" remained salient in White
House communications about him: in a speech given on the occasion of
Anwar al-Awlaki's death on September 30, President Obama stated that he
"repeatedly called on individuals in the United States and around the globe
to kill innocent men, women, and children to advance a murderous
agenda," 03 stating:
Once again, it is not possible to assess claims that Mr. al-Awlaki was
involved in the Ft. Hood shootings; details about his role in the Detroit
Christmas Day bombings are slowly emerging, however, they remain
vague. Another Justice Department memo about the Christmas Day Bombing, however indicates that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab "was committed to
his mission, seeking out and finding Al Qaeda and Anwar al Awlaki, and
then becoming involved in planning and training for a significant amount of
time."'0 The Supplemental Appendix to the report elaborates on this further, stating that:
100. Remarks of John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec.
and Counterterrorism, on Ensuring al-Qa'ida's Demise, Office of the White House
Press Sec'y (Jun. 29, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter.
101. Stickney, supra note 14.
102. Carney, supra note 83.
103. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks at the "Change of Office,"
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony, The White House Office of the Press
Sec'y (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-president-change-office-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff-ceremony.
104. U.S. v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (E.D.M.S.D 2012) (Mem. at 2-3, DAS
No. 20005) available at http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/view-online.php?url=
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.washingtonpost.com%2Fwp-srv%2Fworld%2Fdocuments%2
Fumar-farouk-abdul-mutallab-sentence-brief.pdf.
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Once in Yemen, defendant [Mr. Abdulmutallab] visited mosques and
asked people he met if they knew how he could meet Awlaki [sic].
Eventually, defendant made contact with an individual who in turn
made Awlaki [sic] aware of defendant's desire to meet him. Defendant provided this individual with the number for his Yemeni cellular
telephone. Thereafter, defendant received a text message from Awlaki [sic] telling defendant to call him, which defendant did. During
their brief telephone conversation, it was agreed that defendant would
send Awlaki [sic] a written message explaining why he wanted to
become involved in jihad. Defendant took several days to write his
message to Awlaki [sic], telling him of his desire to become involved
in jihad, and seeking Awlaki's [sic] guidance. After receiving defendant's message, Awlaki [sic] sent defendant a response, telling him
that Awlaki [sic] would find a way for defendant to become involved
in jihad. Thereafter, defendant was picked up and driven through the
Yemeni desert. He eventually arrived at Awlaki's [sic] house, and
stayed there for three days. During that time, defendant met with
Awlaki [sic] and the two men discussed martyrdom and jihad. .. by
the end of his stay, Awlaki [sic] had accepted defendant for a martyrdom mission. Defendant left Awlaki's [sic] house, and was taken to
another house, where he met AQAP bomb maker Ibrahim Al Asiri...
Thereafter, Al Asiri discussed a plan for a martyrdom mission with
Awlaki, who gave it final approval, and instructed Defendant
Abdulmutallab on it. For the following two weeks, defendant trained
in an AQAP camp, and received instruction in weapons and indoctrination in jihad. . Ibrahim Al Asiri constructed a bomb for defendant's suicide mission and personally delivered it to Defendant
Abdulmutallab. This was the bomb that defendant carried in his underwear on December 25, 2009. Al Asiri traineddefendant in the use
of the bomb, including by having defendant practice the manner in
which the bomb would be detonated; that is, by pushing the plunger
of a syringe, causing two chemicals to mix, and initiating a fire
(which would then detonate the explosive). . .Awlaki told defendant
that he would create a martyrdom video that would be used after the
defendant's attack. Awlaki [sic] arrangedfor a professional film
crew to film the video. A wlaki [sic] assisted defendant in writing his
martyrdom statement,and it wasfilmed over a period of two to three
days. The full video was approximately five minutes in length. . .
Although Awlaki [sic] gave defendant operational flexibility, Awlaki
instructed defendant that the only requirements were that the attack
be on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over U.S. soil.
Beyond that, Awlaki [sic] gave defendant discretion to choose the
flight and date. Awlaki [sic] instructed defendant not to fly directly
from Yemen to Europe, as that could attract suspicion. As a result,
defendant took a circuitous route, traveling from Yemen to Ethiopia
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to Ghana to Nigeria to Amsterdam to Detroit. Prior to defendant's
departure from Yemen, Awlaki's [sic] last instructions to him were to
wait until the airplane was over the United States and then to take the
plane down (emphasis added).105
Mr. Abdulmutallib described the above activities during several debriefing statements he gave to FBI agents between January and April
2010.106 It remains unclear as to whether or not it was this information that
led to the targeting of Mr. al-Awlaki in September of 2011. An administration official would not tell the Washington Post about the specific intelligence behind the decision to target Mr. al Awlaki, but said that this
information was a "piece of the puzzle."10
When speaking in front of an audience at Northwestern on March 3,
2012, Attorney General Eric Holder referred to Mr. Abdulmutallib's relationship with Mr. al-Awlaki before going on to give the administration's
justification for engaging in targeted killings of American citizens, saying,
"Umar Farouk Abdumutallib described to FBI agents in detail how he became "inspired to carry out an act of jihad," and in pursuit of doing so,
"traveled to Yemen, and made contact with Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, and a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula." 08
Finally, the leaked Justice Department White Paper not only fails to
mention any operational activities that would render Mr. al-Alwaki a combatant, but furthermore, appears acknowledge the fact that he does little
more than "plan" or "plot". The White Paper also claims that civilian status
results from "evidence" that an individual is not "planning" or "plotting," or
not "involved" with Al Qai'da:
The condition that an operational leader present an 'imminent' threat
of violent attack against the United States does not require the United
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack . . . will take place

in the near future. . .. By nature. . .the threat posed by Al Qa'ida and
its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in
judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an
imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate. . . Where the al
Qa'ida member in questions has recently been involved in activities
105. Id. at 12-14.
106. Peter Finn, Awlaki Directed Christmas 'underwear bomber' plot, Justice De-

partment memo says, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/al-awlaki-directed-christmas-underwear-bomber-plot-justicedepartment-memo-says/2012/02/1 0/glQArDOt4Qstory.html.
107. Id.
108. Terry Frieden, Holder: Not 'assassination' to target Americans in terror
hunt, CNN SECURITY CLEARANCE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/

03/05/holder-targeting-american-terrorists-not-assasination/.
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posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States,
and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, the member's involvement in Al Qa'ida's continuing terrorist campaign against the United States would support
the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.109
The White Paper does not substantiate its claims that Mr. al-Alwaki
was "planning" or "plotting;" nor does it directly address the issue of combatancy under IHL. It is possible that there is additional analysis that was
not included in the leaked portion of the White Paper, however,o10 according to all publicly available information, including that which appeared in
the White Paper, Mr. al-Alwaki's "planning," "plotting," and affiliation
with Al Qa'id does not fulfill the criterion of "continuous combat function"
as set forth under IHL: his only specific activities on behalf of al-Qa'ida
consist of creating and disseminating sermons over YouTube, offering
counseling of a religious nature to troubled persons like the Fort Hood
shooter and Mr. Abdulmuttalib, and engaging in some form of "planning"
that may or may not have resulted in the execution of actual terrorist plots.
To be sure, the nature of his counseling was distasteful at best and
harmful at worst, but this doesn't render the act of counseling one of direct
participation under IHL. Furthermore, although he is described as a
"leader" of AQAP, there is no available evidence of his doing much of any
leading; nor is there publicly available evidence of him actively recruiting
anyone, given that Attorney General Holder states above that Mr.
Abdulmuttalib sought out Mr. al-Awlaki, rather than the other way
around.'II
It would seem that the American and British media's characterization
of him as "cleric," in spite of the administration's insistence that he was an
"ideologue" or a "propagandist," was thus an accurate description of Mr.
al-Awlaki's function, given that it appears that his function was limited to
giving seroms YouTube, advising Mr. Abdulmuttalib on religious matters,
and "plotting" or "planning."
We will now move to consider the possibility that Anwar al-Awlaki
was a chaplain, and what this means for IHL and for the legality of his
killing.
109. DOJ

WHITE PAPER,

supra note 67, at 8.

110. See Marco Mazzetti, Charli Savage, and Scott Shane, How a U.S. citizen
TIMES, Mar. 9 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/1 O/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americascross-hairs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Il . Id.

came to be in America's cross-hairs. N.Y.
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THE RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL EXCEPTION UNDER IHL:
WHAT IS A "CHAPLAIN"?

Mentions of holy men working side-by-side with fighters to inspire
them as they charged into battle can be found in the Bible. This relationship
developed and eventually became the norm through much of subsequent
history.1 12 The designation of "chaplain" can be traced to a fourth century
Gallic legend wherein Saint Martin of Tours gave half of his cloak to a
freezing beggar, and was inspired thereafter to abandon his military career
to become a man of the cloth. 1 3 The part of his cloak that remained became
a sacred relic, and the officer assigned to guard it was called the "chapelain"-guardian of the cloak.1 1 4 In pre-modern times, clerics were exempt
from military service, and their presence on the battlefield often resulted in
a temporary cease-fire." 5 As feudal forces grew into modern armies, a permanent corps of military chaplains emerged in France, Spain, Britain, and
colonial America." 6 The Geneva Convention of 1864 in fact mentions
chaplains, and states that they "shall have the benefit of the same neutrality
[as military hospitals and ambulances] when on duty, and while there remain any wounded to be brought in or assisted."
Thus, the designation of chaplain carries heavy significance, as religious personnel are non-combatants that must be "respected and protected in
all circumstances;" this applies "at any time throughout the duration of an
armed conflict, at any place, and in any case where chaplains are retained
by the adversary, whether temporarily or for a prolonged period of time.""'7
The Annotated Supplement to the United States Naval Handbook (1997)
notes, for example: "[the United States] supports the principle in [Article 15
of the 1977 Additional Protocol I] that civilian . . . religious personnel be
respected and protected and not be made the objects of attack."" 8 The Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) similarly "do not have a policy of targeting the religious personnel of their adversaries," subject to the "personnel being clearly
112.

ALBERT ISAAC SLomovITz, THE FIGHTING RABBIS: JEWISH MILITARY CHAP-

LAINS AND AMERICAN HISTORY

2 (1999).

113. Id.

114. Id.
115.

GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-

RIAN LAW IN WAR

193-94 (2010).

116. Id. at 3.

117. DIETER FLECK , THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 802 (Dieter Fleck & Michael Bothe eds., 1995).
118. Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, Customary IHL: Rules Relating to Rule 27:
Religious Personnel,available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/engl/docs/v2_rul_

rule27.

2013-2014]

Chaplaincy Exception in IHL

25

recognizable and not participating in hostile activities." Pursuant to this
principle, the 2006 IDF manual on the rules of warfare states: "As long as
they do not participate in the fighting, it is forbidden to attack [ministers of
religion] or to take them into captivity.""19
In determining whether or not Mr. al-Awlaki was a "chaplain," I will
consider his activities, as described by the Obama administration, as well as
potential objections pertaining to his classification as such. Additionally, I
will compare al-Awlaki's activities to those of chaplains in the U.S. Chaplain Corps, the IDF, the IRA, and various other groups, to assess whether or
not his activities as a "cleric" violated his designation as a chaplain under
IHL.
A.

Can a TransnationalArmed Group Like AQAP Have its Own
"Chaplains"?

Although the conflict in Yemen is not explicitly of a religious nature
from the perspective of American forces, it arguably has a religious dimension to AQAP, given that they the organization has called for the establishment of a "global caliphate" and justifies their continued engagement with
American targets using religious discourse. Additionally, all members presumably share a common faith, and a common interpretation of that faith.
This does not mean, however, that all chaplains for AQAP are therefore
combatants under IHL, or conversely, that all AQAP combatants are therefore chaplains.
During the conflict in Northern Ireland, which had both religious and
political roots, Irish Catholic priests were not considered combatants by the
United Kingdom ("UK") and Northern Ireland, even though observers initially believed that the warring groups were led by members of the
clergy.120 12 1 Even so, and in spite of the key role played by priests, members of the clergy, and the Catholic church during the course of and resolution of that conflict, the 1981 UK Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC")
manual explicitly states that "Chaplains attached to the armed forces have
protected status and may not be attacked . . . They may not be armed"l 22
and the 2004 UK LOAC manual prohibited attacks on chaplains in noninternational armed conflicts.123
119. Id.
120. Georgie Ann Geyer, As Northern Ireland changed, peace became possible,
HERALD-JOURNAL, Apr. 15, 1998, at Al0, availableat http://goo.gl/QiQ63.
121. Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, Customary IHL:Rules, supra note 118.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Some Irish Catholic priests-though not all-failed to condemn the
violent tactics of the IRA,.12 4 The noncombatant status of priests continued,
even after a priest associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) may
have been involved in an attack that killed nine people, and still endured
when the Catholic Church assisted in protecting him from prosecution by
moving him to another parish.125 Priests even played a critical role during
the disarming of all Northern Irish paramilitaries in 2005, confirming to the
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning that the guerrillas had destroyed their weapons.126 Their noncombatant status persisted
in spite of the important role they played in an activity unrelated to the
ministry, or to the pastoral care of troops.
It also bears mentioning that under International Human Rights Law
("IHL"), a "chaplain" does not necessarily need to be an adequate, or even
competent, representation of his or her faith to qualify as such; rather, chaplains are personnel "exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry." 27
Furthermore, chaplains are still considered chaplains under IHL even if they
belong to a militia, a volunteer corps, or an organized resistance movement
whose members are combatants.12 8 Accordingly, Mr. al-Awlaki may still be
considered chaplain even though his duties were carried out for the benefit
of AQAP. As the content of Mr. al-Awlaki's sermons and his interpretations of Islamic doctrine were distasteful in keeping with the goals of
AQAP, it is difficult to say with any certainty that he "violate[d] the religious practices of [his] religious organization" because the "religious organization" with which he identified espoused views similar to his own, and
engaged in "religious practices" in keeping with those views.
The political nature of Mr. al-Awlaki's YouTube videos would also
not disbar him from chaplaincy, given that there exists some precedent for
military chaplains expressing controversial political views in public. For
example, in Rigdon v. Perry the Supreme Court ruled that American military chaplains are not subject to the same restrictions on speech as other
members of the armed services, who are, among other things, prohibited
124. Jim Dee, Securing the Irish Peace, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus (Oct. 9, 2006),
http://www.fpif.org/articles/securing-theirish-peace.
125. Jason Walsh, Did a Catholic priest assist an IRA murder in Northern Ireland? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-News/2010/0824/Did-a-Catholic-priest-assist-an-IRA-murder-in-NorthernIreland.
126. Dee, supra note 124.
127. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary Int'l HumanitarianLaw, Vol. I 90
(2005).
128. FLECK, supra note 177.
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from participation in partisan political activities and solicitation of votes.129
American military chaplains have "rank without command" as they are considered "on loan from their faith community" and are separated from the
military if they lose their religious endorsement.130 Religious officiants in
the American military therefore hold a "right to autonomy in determining
the religious content of their sermons" and would suffer irreparable harm to
their statutory and constitutional right to preach without being censored.131
The fact that Mr. al-Awlaki has had no religious training would also
not preclude him from being a chaplain under IHL. Religious training is not
necessarily required of chaplains in all armed forces, and there is no mention of formal training in International Committee of the Red Cross materials devoted to customary rules about chaplaincy.132 To be sure, a vast
majority of U.S. Armed Forces chaplains, for example, are Muslim, Jewish,
or Christianl 33 and benefit from formal religious training or membership in
the clergy. However, the Air Force Academy has recently built a worship
center in Colorado to cater to adherents of "Earth-based" religions such as
Wiccans, Pagans, and Druids, wherein Chaplain Maj. Darren Duncan,
branch chief of cadet faith communities at the academy, oversees worship.134 Additionally, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway have allowed
secular humanist chaplains to serve atheists.13 5 A lack of formal training is
therefore not grounds to exclude Mr. al-Awlaki from the status of chaplain.
B.

Is Anwar al-Awlaki a Chaplain Under IHL Even if He Engaged in
Non-Religious Activities or Contributed to the Realization of
Military Missions?

During the Civil War, Chaplains were solely tasked with advising their
commanders on the "moral and religious conditions of the troops" and mak129. Steven H. Aden, The Navy's Perfect Storm: Has a Military ChaplaincyForfeited Its ConstitutionalLegitimacy by Establishing Denominational Preference?, 31
W. ST. L. REV. 185, 198 (2003-2004).
130. Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 159 (D.D.C. 1997).
131. Id. at 162, 165.
132. See Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, Customary IHL: Rules, supra note 118.
133. Matthew Hay Brown, Atheists in U.S. Military Seek Official Recognition
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-namilitary-atheists-2011 11 14,0,7258479.story.
134. Jenny Deam, Air ForceAcademy adopts to pagans,druids, witches and Wiccans, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/lana-air-force-pagans-20111127,0,6813530.story.
135. Gregory Johnsen, Op-Ed, A False Target in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2010, at Al9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/opinion/20johnsen.
html.
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ing suggestions that would be conducive to "social happiness" and "moral
improvement." 3 6 Since then, however, the role of the chaplain has changed
considerably, and the only prohibited activities outside of a combat area
during an armed conflict are those that-as aforementioned-would "vio37
late the religious practices of the chaplain's religious organization." The
U.S. Army, for example, is of the opinion that "religious beliefs and practices not only influence the adversary, [but also] influence the civilians and
their societies within the operational area and may even impact the ideology
or functioning of the government." 38 U.S. Army Chaplains therefore act as
"principal advisor[s]" to commanders regarding the "impact of religion on
military operations" and provide advice "that contributes to situational
awareness such as cultural, interagency, multinational, and humanitarian assistance considerations."' 39 American chaplains also "may participate in operation planning and will advise the command and staff on matters as

appropriate."

40

Chaplains are furthermore still considered as such under international
law even if they engage in activities that are not explicitly religious in nature, if they briefly take up arms, if they act in an advisory capacity to
military or state leadership, or if they contribute to the success of a military
mission: American military commanders, for example, feel that chaplains
play an important role because they "contribute[ ] significantly to the task
of winning the war"' 4 ' and -the Army website characterizes chaplains as
"crucial to the success of the Army's mission." 42 By raising morale, fighting spirit, and providing a justification for some of the more challenging
aspects of military service, chaplains' mission has been characterized as
136. John W. Brinsfield & Eric Wester, Ethical Challengesfor Commanders and
their Chaplains, 54 JOINT FORCES Q. 20, 20 (2009), availableat http://www.ndu.edu/
press/lib/images/jfq-54/5.pdf.
137. William A. Wildhack, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads: Navigating the
Intersection of Free Speech, Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51
NAVAL L. REV. 217, 242 (2005) (quoting OPNAV Instruction 1730.ID from Chief of
Naval Ops to All Ships and Stations [May 6, 2003] on file with the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations).
138. JoINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. ARMED FORCES, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT
OPERATION 11-2 (2009).
139. Id. at viii, 1-1.
140. Id. at 1-2.
141. DALE Roy HERSPRING, SOLDIERS, COMMISSARS, AND CHAPLAINS: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE CROMWELL 43 (2001).
142. Careers and Jobs, Go ARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/
(last visited
browse-career-and-job-categories/administrative-support/chaplain.html
Nov. 10, 2012).
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"indispensable." 43 The Israeli Defense Forces places a similar importance
on the contribution of its own religious personnel. For example, Brigadier
General Avichai Rontzki told students in November of 2011 that "religious
individuals made better combat troops."144
This expansion in the role of the chaplain is a fairly recent development that has its roots in the Vietnam War, wherein chaplains were increasingly called upon to assist in the project of nation building and aid in
population security, as well as act as a liaison between the military and
local civilians. Chaplains also participated in a civic action programs
(CAPS) to "gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for the
Armed Forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and worth of the
individual." 4 5 Although chaplains were not expected to be experts on local
religion, local customs, or local culture, commanders did "exploit" chaplains' knowledge of these subjects when possible.14 6 Staff Chaplain Allen
Craven, for example, participated in the creation and development of the
Unit Leader's Personal Response handbook, which inter alia served as a
primer on Southeast Asian cultural and religious traditions. 147 Chaplains in
Vietnam clearly assisted in the accomplishment of military objectives
through helping commanders better understand indigenous people and advising commanders whose efforts were hindered by a flawed or incomplete
understanding of local practices, religious beliefs, and customs.14 8
Today, the U.S. Chaplains are directed to "volunteer to participate or
cooperate in nonreligious, noncombatant functions that contribute to the
welfare of the command," 49 however the scope of these "noncombatant"
functions may certainly include activities that contribute to the overall success of the mission. The Army Chaplain Corps Activities Manual summarizes the scope, importance, and purpose of chaplains' duties as follows:
143. HERSPRING, supra note 141, at 47.
144. Anshel Pfeffer, IDF Chief Rabbi: Troops who show mercy to enemy will be
'damned,' HAARETz (Nov. 15, 2009, 1:04 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/
news/idf-chief-rabbi-troops-who-show-mercy-to-enemy-will-be-damned- 1.4175.
145. Jaqueline E. Whitt, Dangerous Liaisons: The Context and Consequences of
OperationalizingMilitary Chaplains, 92 MIL. REV. 53, 57 (2012) available at http://
usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120

430_artOlO.pdf (quoting "Chaplain Orientation-RVN" U.S. Army Chaplain School,
Fort Hamilton, NY, Dec. 1968, 1-5, USACHCS Vietnam Files Box 5).

146. Id. at 59.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Dep't of the Army, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, ARMY REGULATION
165-113, Dec. 2009, available at http://www.chapnet.army.mil/pdf/activities.pdf.
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The increasing appearance of Irregular Warfare emphasizes the importance of diplomacy, stability and predictability of Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. The OCONUS ASCC Chaplains
develop opportunities in support of Combatant Commander objectives to enhance Chaplain contacts and mutual projects with foreign
Chaplaincies that build trust and confidence, share information, and
maintain influence with American allies. These military to military
opportunities are part of Combatant Command or ASCC Commander
key leader engagements. Chaplains involved in these activities will
comply with strategic political objectives and keep combatant command Chaplains informed of all scheduled opportunities and provide
an after action report to the combatant command Chaplain within 7
calendar days of the conclusion of the event.' 50
While the FM 1-05 declares "chaplains should not perform the following: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition," it
also "gives a great amount of latitude as to how chaplains should handle
situations if they receive such information."' 5' Additionally, chaplains have
been able to establish one-to-one relationships with Iraqis in a way that
soldiers and marines have not; these relationships "are key to both intelligence collection and winning 'hearts and minds"' and in this way, contribute to the success of the mission and to the war effort in general.1 52 A
chaplain can also serve as a "spokesperson to foster awareness about indigenous concerns, issues, or attitudes" or act as an intermediary within the
context of a counter-insurgency. 15 Sometimes, these activities culminate in
'Track Two Diplomacy,' "154 wherein U.S. chaplains meet with local leaders
and develop strategy or attempt to influence public opinion.' 55 These activities, as well as the military's emphasis on "collecting human intelligence"
mean that "chaplains may be put in a position that potentially compromises
56
their noncombatant role when they engage religious leaders."
On occasion, U.S. chaplains have engaged in specific activities that
veer uncomfortably close to combatancy, and have done so with the knowledge of or even at the direction of their supervisors. For example, James
Yee, a Muslim US army chaplain stationed at Guantinamo, was instructed
150. Id. at 52.
151. George Adams, Chaplains as Liaisons With Religious Leaders: Lessons
From Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 15 (2006) available at http://
www.usip.org/files/resources/PWmarch20062.pdf.

152. Id. at 33.
153. Whitt, supra note 145, at 59.

154. Brinsfield & Wester, supra note 136, at 21.
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156. Adams, supra note 151.
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to "advise the commander of the detention operation. . .how the religious
practices of the prisoners affected the operation" to make the interrogation
procedure more effective.' 57 This may, of course, be an isolated incident
and is not represented in official policy. Advising military personnel, providing intelligence on local customs and ideologies, and engaging in negotiations with local religious leaders are, however, officially sanctioned
activities, and taken in their totality amount to what U.S. Military Academy
Professor Jacqueline Whitt has referred to as the "operationalization" of
military chaplains:' 5 8
By explicitly and purposefully involving chaplains more directly in
the official tactical, operational, and strategic military mission, the
organization undermines the chaplain's somewhat ambiguous status,
which has afforded him a wide and flexible range of roles and functions in peacetime and in war.

.

. Such close ties to a formal Ameri-

can military mission could seriously jeopardize chaplains' status as
noncombatants, undermine a chaplain's personal security, and compromise his credibility as a member of the clergy rather than as an
agent of human intelligence collection. 5 9
If we apply U.S. Chaplain Corps standards to AQAP, then, and examine the degree to which Mr. al-Awlaki was involved in planning operation, advising on military strategy, and participating in the training or
indoctrination of fighters, it appears he still remains a chaplain. To be sure,
in his aforementioned March 3 speech, Attorney General Eric Holder identified Mr. al Awlaki as a "senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces." However, even though Mr. al Awlaki may have played a role
in the failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing, there is no evidence that his
primary role was tactical or operational in this event or in any other. Consider that Mr. Abdulmutallib's testimony indicates that he "discussed martyrdom andjihad"with Mr. al-Awlaki for a period of days, and that Mr. alAwlaki "told [Mr. Abdulmutallib] that jihad requires patience but comes
with many rewards," and then "assisted [Mr. Abdulmutallib] in writing his
martyrdom statement."' 60
It was only after Mr. Abulmutallib returned from tactical training at an
unspecified location under the tutelage of unspecified persons, with a bomb
made by Mr. Al Asiri and with instructions for its use provided by Mr. Al
157. Ex-Guantanamo Captain James Yee on Faith and Patriotism Under Fire,
Now! (May 22, 2006), http://www.democracynow.org/2006/5/22/ex-guan
tanamo_chaplainjames-yeeon.
158. Whitt, supra note 145, at 54.
159. Whitt, supra note 145, at 54.
160. U.S. v. Farouk Abdulmutallab, supra note 104, at 13-14.
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Asiri that Mr. al-Awlaki resumed his involvement in the plan. At this point,
he "instructed defendant that the only requirements were that the attack be
on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over U.S. soil," the nature
of his mission-that of suicide bombing on an airliner with the U.S. as a
target-apparently already having been decided at the AQAP training
camp, rather than by Mr. al-Alwaki himself. Given available information,
then, it is difficult to conclude that Mr. al Awlaki's primary role in this
mission was that of providing operational or tactical training.
This is not to say he had no part whatsoever in the plan; he did, as Mr.
Abdulmutallib indicates, "instructed defendant that the only requirements
were that the attack be on a U.S. airliner, and that the attack take place over
U.S. soil." However, this does not mean that he automatically loses his
noncombatant status, or the status of chaplain. A Civil War Chaplain was
actually awarded a Medal of Honor for "voluntar[ily] carrying a musket in
the ranks of his regiment and render[ing] heroic service in retaking the Federal Works which had been captured by the enemy."'61 In 2003, a U.S.
Army Chaplain in Baghdad "picked up a weapon and started firing at the
enemy," later explaining that he "[has] no problem with that in [his] conscience." 62 Of course, if captured while in the act of fighting, or engaged
in preparation to fight, a chaplain would be subjected to treatment in keeping with his precapture conditions, rendering him an unlawful combatant.
It would also be difficult to argue that expressions supporting, excusing, or condoning violence, or using religious discourse to encourage fighters, would automatically disqualify Mr. al-Awlaki from the status of
chaplain. In other words, the violent content in many of Mr. al-Awlaki's
YouTube sermons would allow him to remain a chaplain according to the
standards set by the U.S. Navy so long as he retains the endorsement of his
"faith community;" so too would the fact that he encouraged Mr.
Abdulmuttalib to blow up an airliner.'6 3 During the North Ireland conflict,
as aforementioned, some Irish priests refused to explicitly condemn the tactics of the IRA, regarding such violence as a "reaction against the source of
the present injustice" and arguing that "these people have had every nonviolent means of resistance or amelioration of conditions cut off from
them."'6 In November of 2011, Israel Defense Forces' Chief Rabbi told
students in a pre-army yeshiva program that "in times of war, whoever
doesn't fight with all his heart and soul is damned - if he keeps his sword
161. SoLIS, supra note 115, at 194.
162. SOLIs, supra note 115, at 194-95.
163. Id.
164. Irish American Information Service, British violence ignoredby church, say
Irish priests, GREEN LEFr (July 20, 1994), http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/8568.
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from bloodshed, if he shows mercy toward his enemy when no mercy
should be shown." 65
Finally, participating in "indoctrination" at training camps or otherwise
might also not disqualify Mr. al Awlaki from being a chaplain, given that
IDF Chief Rabbis are heavily involved in the "indoctrination and education" of IDF troops.166 While American chaplains, on the other hand, are not
expected to indoctrinate troops, they provide religious counseling that inter
aliaaddress soldiers' concerns surrounding the moral, ethical, and religious
soundness of killing and dying in battle.167 For example, at a funeral service
held after the battle of Fallujah in Iraq, Chaplain Bill Devine comforted
those in attendance by saying that "there is nothing more Christian than
what we are doing here." 68 It is therefore difficult to say that participation
in the indoctrination of AQAP disqualifies Mr. al-Awlaki from noncombatant status.
If we compare the role played by Mr. al-Alwaki in AQAP with the
example set by the U.S. Chaplain Corps, the U.K. armed forces manual, and
the IDF, then, Mr. al-Awlaki still may remain religious personnel and not a
combatant.
C.

Did the Obama Administration ConsiderAnwar al-Alwaki to be a
Cleric?

Finally, it bears mentioning that although the administration never referred to him as the "American born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki," the Press
Secretary and other administration officials did not correct reporters who
referred to Mr. al-Awlaki as a "cleric:"

Q[UESTION]:

What is your assessment of the situation in Yemen
now as a terror hotbed, if you will, a source of the kind of plots that
we saw on Christmas, especially considering the comments that have
come out of there in the past couple of days from the President of
Yemen and from a leading cleric there talking about foreign intervention and what it would be bring?
MR. GIBBS: Well, look, as you well know, this has been on the
President and the national security team's radar for quite some
time. The security situation there obviously remains quite perilous.
There are vast areas of largely ungoverned space that have attracted
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other extremist allies in
165. Pfeffer, supra note 144.

166.

MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL

167.

HERSPRING,

168. OLIVER
229 (2008).

189 (2011).

supra note 141, at 47.

NORTH, AMERICAN HEROES: IN THE

FIGHT AGAINST

RADICAL ISLAM

34

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

Yemen and throughout the region. I think the President and his team
have been and still are acutely aware of the threats that could be
emanating and are emanating from that region.
And on a later occasion, after the Ft. Hood shootings, a journalist again
referred to Mr. al-Awlaki as a "cleric" during a Q and A session with the
White House Press Secretary, and again, was not corrected:

Q[UESTION]

Mr. Brennan, I want to pick up on something that
General Jones said in his interview with USA Today. He referred to
the Fort Hood massacre as strike one, and I'm curious if you can
explain the to American public why things that were learned after
Fort Hood - Yemen, a cleric who has quite a visible role in advocating for terrorism - didn't create within the intelligence community
and the larger apparatus a higher sensitivity to the kinds of things also
visible in the Abdulmutallib case. And how much does that disturb
you? [emphases mine]...
MR. BRENNAN: On the issue of Mr. Awlaki, yes, we were very
concerned after the Fort Hood shooting about what else he might be
doing here. And that's why there was a very determined and concerted effort after that to take a look at what else he might be trying
to accomplish here in the homeland. Now, remember, Mr.
Abdulmutallab was a much different story in terms of a Nigerian who
traveled to Yemen and then came over here. But what it clearly indicates is that there is a seriousness of purpose on the part of al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula to carry out attacks here in the United States
- whether they're reaching people through the Internet, or whether
or not, in fact, they are sending people abroad (emphasis added);. 169
Moreover, administration officials lent their comments to a vast number of newspaper articles and blog posts that referred to Mr. al-Awlaki as a
"cleric" without offering any corrections. For example, US officials warned
of possible retaliation in a CNN article titled "U.S. Officials Warn of Possible Retaliation After an al Qaeda Cleric is Killed,"170 and Attorney General
Eric Holder gave an interview to ABC News wherein he is reported to have

169. PressBriefing on Security Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/press-briefing-security-review#transcript.
170. CNN Wire Staff, U.S. Officials Warn of Possible RetaliationAfter al Qaeda
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said that many a! Qaeda converts are linked to "radical cleric Anwar al
Awlaki himself."17'
The fact the administration did not correct, nor respond, to claims that
Mr. al-Awlaki was a "cleric" makes it difficult to conclude that the administration regarded Mr. al-Awlaki's function as purely tactical or operational.

VII.

ANWAR AL-AWLAKI MAY HAVE BEEN A
CHAPLAIN UNDER IHL

Once again, it bears mentioning that the release of classified information about Mr. al-Awlaki might significantly affect this analysis. It also cannot be stressed enough that the above section in no way offers support for
his ideas, nor for the notion that his interpretation of Islam was consistent
with the central tenets of that faith, nor for the idea that his actions are in
anyway morally or ethically comparable to that of American, IDF, Irish, or
British chaplains. The purpose of this paper is to examine Mr. al-Awlaki's
actions under IHL, determine his designation under IHL, and draw a conclusion about the legality of his killing based on this designation.
Under this criteria, then, and according to publicly available information, it appears that Mr. al-Awlaki did not deviate from IHL's standard for
religious personnel, and that there is precedent not only for chaplains engaging in political speech, but also for condoning violence, taking up arms
in the heat of combat, participating in interrogations, indoctrinating troops,
giving advice to military commanders, and performing important functions
that assist in the realization of military goals and are not explicitly related to
the ministry. Additionally, although the Obama administration was careful
not to refer to Mr. al-Awlaki as a "cleric," much was made of his YouTube
sermons, his interest in the religious concept of jihad (however understood)
and his mobilization of religious discourse to inspire others to engage in
violence. Furthermore, reporters and news outlets were using the term
"cleric," even in front of such persons as Attorney General Eric Holder or
the White House Press Secretary (see above), and it appears that no effort
was made to counter the widely-applied moniker of "American Born
Cleric." Therefore, given the description of his activities as supplied by the
Obama administration, and given that Mr. al-Awlaki employed religious
discourse in service of AQAP's agenda, gave hundreds of sermons that he
made available on YouTube, was a "midlevel religious functionary" 72 ac171. Jack Cloherty & Pierre Thomas, Attorney General'sBlunt Warning on Terror Attacks, ABC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/attorney-general-eric-holders-blunt-warning-terror-attacks/story?id=I 2444727#.Tzg738 IENbw.
172. Johnsen, supra note 135.
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cording to an expert on Yemen, and was repeatedly referred to as a "cleric"
by reporters without any correction from the Obama administration, it is
difficult to place him in any other category under IHL other than
"chaplain."
Penultimately, Anwar al-Awlaki is dead, but the issues raised in this
paper are not moot. It should also be clear at this point that the criterion for
determining whether an individual is religious personnel is largely undefined in IHL, meaning that there exists no clear guideline as to who is an
"ideologue" (as Anwar al-Awlaki was often called by the administration)173
and who is a "cleric" (as he was called by the press).174 While each military
has its own unique regulations in place to guide the behavior of its officers-including, but not limited to, chaplains-the international legal
standard for chaplaincy is merely one wherein an individual is solely employed for religious purposes either permanent or temporary, 7 5 and, although he may engage other activities, is primarily a religious officiant. The
nature of a chaplain's employment has been left up to individual states, and
the manner in which a chaplain chooses to express himself, as it turns out,
is not necessarily grounds for a chaplain losing his non-combatant status,
nor is it even clearly grounds for losing his position as a chaplain.
The difference between an ideology and a particular expression of religious belief is often in the eye of the beholder; furthermore, there is no
such category as an "ideologue" in IHL. The result is that there is no practical category available-other than chaplain-for describing a person whose
primary function involved the production of ideology. As I have pointed out
in this Article, the GWOT has challenged the framework of IHL, particularly insofar as the principles of distinction and group membership are concerned. Additionally, the designation of who is and who isn't religious
personnel, particularly within the context of a conflict that has arguably
taken on religious dimensions from the perspective of one or more players,
may be another aspect of IHL that deserves serious scrutiny in terms of its
applicability to the GWOT.
173. Murphy, supra note 99.
174. Alfano, supra note 20, at 1.
175. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention (1)for the Amelioration of the
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